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Monadology and ethnography: Towards a Tardian Monadic Ethnography 
 
Abstract: 
This article outlines the project of a ‘monadic ethnography’ based on Gabriel Tarde’s 
monadology. Tarde’s key contention is that ‘everything is a society’, i.e. that the world is 
made up of composite and relational entities of infinitesimal complexity called monads. 
These assemblages of heterogeneous elements engaged in relations of mutual possession  
constitute the object of study of ‘monadic ethnography’. Their analysis, in turn, has a series 
of methodological and formal implications, including a transformation of concepts of scale, 
spatiality and temporality and the need to find representational strategies suitable for 
conveying the monads’ dynamic qualities. A fieldwork example which discusses the making 
of a car part in a small workshop based in the Can Ricart factory in Barcelona is provided. 
Throughout the article, the idea of ‘monadic ethnography’ is discussed in relation to the 
recent rediscovery of Tarde’s work, the work of Bruno Latour and Gilles Deleuze, and the so-
called ‘ontological turn’ in the social sciences.  
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Monadology and ethnography: Towards a Tardian Monadic Ethnography 
 
The restoration of sociologist, criminologist, social psychologist and judge Gabriel Tarde 
(1843-1904) to the pantheon of social theory seems to be steadily under way. Almost 
forgotten after succumbing to Émile Durkheim as the leading figure of French sociology, his 
work has recently enjoyed a remarkable comeback. Very little attention had been paid to 
Tarde’s work until the French re-edition, from 1999 onwards, of most of his work under the 
direction of Éric Alliez. Since then, Tarde has been praised by Bruno Latour (2002; 2005) as 
the precursor to Actor-Network-Theory; taken up by Maurizio Lazzarato (2004) as the 
foundation for a new politics of multiplicity; his great controversy with Durkheim 
reconstructed (Viana Vargas et al., 2008) and even re-enacted;1 and his work been the subject 
of at least one conference2, special issues in various academic journals3, and an edited book 
(Candea, 2010a).  
 The recent translation into English of Tarde’s 1895 masterpiece Monadologie et 
Sociologie (Tarde, 2012), ‘the most metaphysical of the works of the most philosophical of 
sociologists’ (Alliez, 1999; cited in Lorenc, 2012), adds an important piece to this revival. 
Tarde’s monadology – which radically reconfigures the Leibnizian ontology it is based upon 
– is arguably one of his most remarkable theoretical contributions. The aim of this article is to 
explore its far-reaching implications for the conceptualisation and study of the social, and to 
relate those to the practice of ethnographic research.  
 The article is organised as follows: in the next section, Gabriel Tarde’s rediscovery 
and some of his key ideas will be briefly discussed. Then, his monadology will be presented 
in some detail. This is followed by an ethnographic interlude, which will be used in turn to 
inform the ‘monadic ethnography’ proposal developed in the following section. The article 
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concludes with a wider consideration of Tarde’s interest for ethnography in relation to recent 
debates around a so-called ‘ontological turn’ in the social sciences.  
 
Rediscovering Gabriel Tarde 
A good part of the recent literature on Tarde revisits his intellectual dispute with Émile 
Durkheim over the nature and scope of sociology (e.g. Alliez, 2004; Candea, 2010a; Latour, 
2002; 2005; Mucchielli, 2000; Viana Vargas, 1998). It was, we are told, a foundational 
moment for the discipline. Durkheim’s victory would not only explain sociology’s becoming 
over the 20th century, but also the strangeness that reading Tarde produces today and his near 
disappearance from the history of social theory. For those who sympathise with his 
arguments, Tarde represents the path not taken, and going back to his work the possibility of 
plotting a line of flight from sociology (and indeed the social sciences) as we know it today 
(Candea, 2010b). This new wave of interest in Tarde has proved fruitful in reactivating 
several of his intellectual endeavours, including a statistics of the fluctuations of belief and 
desire (Barry, 2010; Didier, 2010); an ‘economic psychology’ or ‘science of passionate 
interests’ (Latour and Lépinay, 2009); the theorisation of ‘contagion’ and ‘virality’ in relation 
to media (Sampson, 2012); or a monadic ‘sociology of associations’ (Latour, 2005; Latour et 
al. 2012). In this article, I will avoid the controversy with Durkheim, already well discussed 
in the literature cited above, and focus instead on Tarde’s monadology, as seen from an 
ethnographer’s point of view. In doing this, I wish to continue a line of work advanced by 
Matei Candea (2010b) and Eduardo Viana Vargas (2010), who already identified the specific 
potential of Tarde’s monadological hypothesis for ethnographic research. More broadly, the 
‘monadic ethnography’ proposal outlined in this article is closely related to assemblage 
theory and actor-network theory (ANT hereafter), which is the reason why I want to engage 
in a partial introduction to the work of Tarde via Deleuze and Latour.4  
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 In 1968 Gilles Deleuze published Différence et Répétition – a book whose title 
already indicates an unequivocal Tardian filiation. In a long footnote, he praises Tarde’s work 
and concludes: ‘All of Tarde’s philosophy may be presented... as a dialectic of difference and 
repetition which founds the possibility of a microsociology upon a whole cosmology’ 
(Deleuze, 1994: 314). There are two focal points of interest here. The first relates to Tarde’s 
thesis that repetition, adaptation and opposition are – in that order – the fundamental 
dynamics that govern all phenomena (Tarde, 2000). In the case of human societies, he argued 
that this triad took the specific form of imitation-innovation-opposition, the idea being that it 
is through and by repetition (imitation) that difference is produced and distributed (as either 
innovations or oppositions):  
 
...it is because certain social phenomena, such as a dogma, phrase, scientific principle, moral maxim, 
prayer, industrial process, or the like, tend to spread in a geometrical ratio by imitative repetition, that 
they interfere with one another in a felicitous or infelicitous manner. That is, the discordant sides of 
their nature come together in certain minds, giving rise to logical or teleological duels, which constitute 
first germs of social oppositions (wars, competitions, and polemics); while the harmonious sides of 
their nature come together in the mind of the genius, or sometimes even in the ordinary mind, 
producing true logical syntheses, inventions, and fruitful originations, which are the source of all social 
adaptation. (Tarde, 2000: 63-64) 
 
The quote above – apart from a fitting introduction to Tarde’s peculiar writing style – hints at 
Tarde’s ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘molecular’ approach, the second focal point of interest for Deleuze, 
further developed with Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. Tarde’s analyses insist in 
tracing those imitations, oppositions and innovations back to their origin in the infinitely 
small, where the key to the big and regular lies. As he put it: ‘...instead of thus explaining 
lesser facts by greater, and the part by the whole, I explain collective resemblances of the 
whole by the massing together of minute elementary acts – the greater by the lesser and the 
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whole by the part’ (2000: 35). Deleuze and Guattari crucially argued that this form of 
‘microsociology’ was not, as Durkheim claimed, devoted to the individual, but to ‘flows’ or 
‘waves’ instead:  
 
Imitation is the propagation of a flow; opposition is binarization, the making binary of flows; invention 
is a conjugation or connection of different flows. What, according to Tarde, is a flow? It is belief or 
desire (the two aspects of every assemblage)... [In] the “molecular” realm of beliefs and desires... the 
distinction between the social and the individual loses all meaning since flows are neither attributable 
to individuals nor overcodable by collective signifiers. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 241, emphasis in 
original).  
 
I will come back to the issue of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ and the individual/collective dualism 
below, in relation to Tarde’s monadology. But before doing so, I will end this section with a 
brief introduction to Bruno Latour’s engagement with Tarde.  
 In a series of key texts (2002; 2005; 2010; 2012), Latour has reclaimed Tarde as a 
precursor to ANT, on the grounds that he had anticipated – by almost 100 years – the idea of 
a ‘sociology of association’: 
 
[Tarde] vigorously maintained that the social was not a special domain of reality but a principle of 
connections; that there was no reason to separate “the social” from other associations like biological 
organisms or even atoms... Above all, he considered the social as a circulating fluid that should be 
followed by new methods and not a specific type of organism. (Latour, 2005: 13)  
 
Because of this general principle of society as association, Tarde’s sociology ignored the 
nature/society divide as well as the micro/macro distinction – two of ANT’s most important 
contributions to social theory. Regarding the former, Tarde argued that society is a universal 
form of association, shared between human and non-human entities, and hence highlighted 
the inadequacy of starting from a divide between natural and social facts à la Durkheim. With 
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regards to the micro/macro distinction, Tarde’s relational and infinitesimal approach 
invalidates it to a large extent, in the sense that the ‘small’ reveals itself to be richer and more 
complex than the ‘big’, which in fact is a mere ‘extension’ of some of its components (Latour, 
2002). I will now turn to Tarde’s monadology, where these counterintuitive positions are 
explained in detail. 
 
Gabriel Tarde’s monadology 
‘The monads, children of Leibniz, have come a long way since their birth’ (Tarde, 2012: 5). 
Monadology and Sociology’s (hereafter MS) first sentence already introduces an important 
caveat: these monads are rather different from Leibniz’s. The term monad, from the Greek 
monas, a ‘unit’ or a ‘one’, has a long tradition in philosophical writings, dating back to the 
Pythagoreans, but it was Leibniz who popularised it in the early 1700s. In the modern sense it 
is used to describe: ‘(1) a simple, irreducible, and sometimes indestructible entity; and (2) the 
minimal unity into which the cosmos and all composite things in it can be resolved; yet (3) 
containing within itself, in contrast to material atoms, powers and relations of which it is 
itself the source’ (Loemker, 2006: 324). Traditionally, a monadology is a ‘metaphysical 
system that interprets the world as a harmonious unity encompassing a plurality of such self-
determining simple entities’ (Loemker, 2006: 324). In other words, classic monadologies 
entail a theory of cosmic harmony, based on the coordination of a multiplicity of monads, 
themselves considered active substances. In Leibniz, monads are differentiated and 
differentiating, but also closed (‘monads have no windows’, as he famously put it [1898: 219]) 
and subject to a higher principle of harmony ensured by the existence of the supreme Monad, 
or God (see Viana Vargas, 1998).  
 Tarde’s monadology departs from this philosophical tradition in key ways. It is, first 
of all, secular; there is no God and no pre-determined harmony. It is, also, an open and 
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infinitesimal system, where monads affect each other and are themselves composite entities. 
MS’s central hypothesis (p. 28) is that ‘everything is a society, that every phenomenon is a 
social fact’: from cells to stars, both living things and inorganic beings, they are all societies – 
where ‘social’ and ‘society’ refer, as Latour indicated, to a form of association rather than 
any particular entity. It is worth examining how he arrives at this remarkable inversion of 
both Spencer’s ‘society as organism’ thesis (1906) and Durkheim’s first rule of the 
sociological method, ‘to consider social facts as things’ (1982). First, Tarde argues that 
reality is made out of monads, which, contrary to Leibniz, are not the simple elements that 
make up aggregates, but composite entities themselves. Drawing from findings in physics, 
cellular theory and chemistry, he argues that science has repeatedly shown how so-called 
individual bodies (e.g. planets, cells, parasites) were in fact ‘a multiplicity of distinct 
elements linked to each other in the same way as they are linked to the elements of other 
aggregates’ (MS, 6). It is only because we look at things from a distance and they are 
unknown to us that we believe them to be ‘indistinct, undifferentiated, and homogenous… 
But everywhere where a scientist digs beneath the indistinction which is apparent to us, he 
discovers an unexpected treasury of distinctions’ (MS: 24). The progress of science, he says, 
continues to break more and more of these indivisible bodies into ‘highly complex 
constructions, furnished with a specific architecture and animated by highly varied internal 
movements’ (MS: 9). In fact, it is in the infinitely small where increasing complexity is found 
and where actions originate, ‘emanating from a multitude of agents who are so many 
invisible and innumerable little gods’ (MS: 25) (Tarde also calls them ‘hidden workers’). We 
know this, Tarde argues, because we can extrapolate what we know from being able to 
observe human society from within:  
 
If we look at the social world, the only one known to us from the inside, we see agents, men, much 
more differentiated and more sharply characterized as individuals, and richer in continual variations, 
 
 
 
 
8 
than are the mechanisms of government or the systems of laws or of beliefs, or even dictionaries or 
grammars, and this differentiation is maintained by their competition. A historical fact is simpler and 
clearer than the states of mind of any of its actors. (MS: 37) 
 
The example above points at two essential characteristic of ‘monads’ or ‘societies’: first, that 
difference (or heterogeneity), and not identity (or homogeneity), is at their core (Viana 
Vargas, 2010); second, that because these entities are the result of the relations between their 
components or, more exactly, a provisional reflection of the hegemony of some of them over 
others, they are unstable. Tarde talks about the ‘internal revolts’ that break apart ‘all great 
regular mechanisms’, provoked by the fact that  
 
their constitutive elements, the soldiers of these diverse regiments, the temporary incarnation of their 
laws, always belong only by one aspect of their being to the world they constitute, and by other aspects 
escape it... The attributes which each element possesses in virtue of its incorporation into its regiment 
do not form the whole of its nature; it has other tendencies and other instincts which come to it from its 
other regimentations; and, moreover… still others which come to it from its basic nature, from itself, 
from its own fundamental substance which is the basis of its struggle against the collective power of 
which it forms a part. (MS: 47) 
 
This sense of internal agitation and instability is linked to the basic drive of monads: they are 
powerless in isolation, so they tend to associate; they are endowed with belief and desire, so 
they aim to conquer and possess other monads:  
 
Each monad draws the world to itself, and thus has a better grasp of itself. Of course, they are parts of 
each other, but they can belong to each other to a greater or lesser extent, and each aspires to the 
highest degree of possession; whence their gradual concentration; and besides, they can belong to each 
other in a thousand different ways, and each aspires to learn new ways to appropriate its peers. Hence 
their transformations. They transform in order to conquer; but, since none will ever submit to another 
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except out of self-interest, none can fully accomplish its ambitious dream, and the sovereign monad is 
exploited by its vassal monads, even as it makes use of them. (MS: 57-8).  
  
Like unsettled particles in search of a companion, monads are ‘bundles of possessive 
agencies’ eager to possess each other, objects of ‘reciprocal desires and beliefs’ (Debaise, 
2008). And this mutual possession, the very definition of society for Tarde, does not tend 
towards a pre-established harmony à la Leibniz; it remains a continuous movement of 
shifting hegemonies and possessions.  
 Relations of ‘possession’ or ‘having’ are indeed more fundamental and offer a much 
more promising footing for social theory than the old philosophy of ‘being’, says Tarde. 
Being is a crude measure of existence: it cannot be quantified, it is folded upon itself. 
Possession, on the other hand, reinforces the priority of relations in the constitution of reality 
and, as the fundamental drive of monads, is universally applicable. As he puts it in an often-
quoted passage:   
 
All philosophy hitherto has been based on the verb Be, the definition of which was the philosopher’s 
stone, which all sought to discover. We may affirm that, if it had been based on the verb Have, many 
sterile debates and fruitless intellectual exertions would have been avoided. From this principle, I am, 
all the subtlety in the world has not made it possible to deduce any existence other than my own: hence 
the negation of external reality. If, however, the postulate I have is posited as the fundamental fact, 
both that which has and that which is had are given inseparably at once. (MS: 52). 
 
I will come back to the implications for ethnography of this conceptualisation of monads as 
unstable and heterogeneous assemblages of infinitesimal complexity defined by their 
relations of possession. But first, let me provide some empirical material to inform the 
discussion.  
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The Black Cap 
 
This ethnographic interlude is taken from a study of the conflict surrounding the eviction and 
demolition of the Can Ricart factory in Barcelona, approved by the City Council as part of a 
rezoning plan affecting the city’s industrial district (Poblenou). I conducted fieldwork 
between 2005 and 2007, a period in which, among other things, a wide alliance to save the 
factory was formed, evictions were resisted and alternative plans produced, negotiations with 
the Council were held, most workshops ended up being displaced, and part of the factory was 
listed as industrial heritage. The following situation took place in June 2005, when most of 
the businesses still had not left the factory and were indeed resisting eviction orders and 
trying to negotiate better compensation payments.5  
 
Daniel Iracheta founded his precision machining company in the 1950s. He started in 
Mariano Aguiló Street, in the Poblenou neighbourhood, and when business grew he moved 
into a bigger workshop in San Joan de Malta Street. He had to move again in 1974, because 
of the City Council’s plans to extend the Diagonal Avenue, which however took twenty-five 
years to complete. He found a suitable space in Can Ricart, which had by then been divided 
into several workshops. Seven-hundred square meters, said Vicente, enough for his forty 
machines and workers. The dog, which had been barking all along, finally stopped as I paid 
him some attention. Vicente’s office sat above the shop floor, and through the window one 
could see and hear the workers and the machines downstairs. 
 Daniel Iracheta died in 1995, aged seventy-one, and the company, now managed by 
his wife Emilia, changed its name to Iracheta Ltd. This had huge implications for the current 
situation, Vicente continued, because the landlord didn’t accept the continuity of the previous 
indefinite lease and made them sign a new five-year contract, which had by now expired and 
was renewed on a monthly basis. Compensation payments were based on the length of the 
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contract, so they were not only facing eviction, but the possibility of having to close. They 
needed about 50 million pesetas to move to a new location, and had only been offered eight 
million. I’m not an actual employee, Vicente clarified, but I’ve been helping out with the 
accounting since my father-in-law died and my mother took charge. I used to work in a bank, 
so I know about these things. I retired a few years ago. My daughter does work for the 
company, he said, as Belén came in and briefly joined the conversation. 
 The relationship with The Car Company had profoundly shaped Iracheta since they 
had started working for them in the seventies. From the layout of the workshop to the 
accounting practices, everything had been adapted to the manufacturer’s requirements and 
protocols. In fact, in 1990 they were awarded the Y9 Quality Status certification, which 
recognized their excellence as suppliers and would soon be a requirement to work for The 
Car Company. Vicente pointed at the wall, where the certificate hung. It’s a Total Quality 
Management system, said Belén, it covers everything since you pick up the phone until the 
part is delivered. We’ve got a Quality Manual which specifies all the processes: making a 
budget, ordering materials, storing parts, packing things for delivery… It allows you to prove 
that the part has been produced as you are supposed to. There is a record of everything we do: 
the measurements that were taken from the sample for quality control, the data generated by 
the statistical software where you introduce them, the certificates of treatment and painting, 
and so on. And not only with respect to manufacturing, said Vicente, there are requirements 
about minimum stock (for example to prevent disruptions in case of a strike), and a storage 
and labelling system that allowed inspectors to come and check the production without even 
asking.  
 Down in the shop floor Vicente and Belén showed me the different machine-tools, the 
storage area and some of the parts they made. Among them was a small black cap, the last 
part they made for The Car Company. It covers the screw of the rear window handle in the 
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Model Qiu, he said. It’s a hinged window, the glass doesn’t go up and down, but instead has a 
lever mechanism to push it out. Already the old Model Alegria used that part. We have been 
making it for twenty-five years now, exclusively for the whole world. It may not look like it, 
but it is a very complicated process, Vicente told me with a smile. I invited him to continue.  
 The raw material, a 0.50 mm thick metal sheet, comes from The Northern Foundry. 
Following the technical specifications of The Car Company, it has to be custom-made using a 
special alloy. Engineers, he said, don’t think how much money they would save if they 
followed standards. The Northern Foundry is a big company, the minimum order they take is 
20,000 kilograms. The sheet comes in rolls of 2,000 meters, which are loaded into the 
machine. First, the progressive stamping press cuts a circular shape, leaving two small tips; it 
then squashes it, constipates the bottom, and finally cuts the two tips that held the piece. It all 
happens continuously, do you know what I mean? Pum-pum-pum. We used to have one of 
those presses, but it is like anything, you have to be an expert to get it right. My father-in-law 
was a mechanic, and the progressive presses are for professionals. But he wouldn’t have got 
the job if he didn’t have the press, so he, a gutsy person, just bought one. He later realised he 
couldn’t master the process, so he asked other nearby workshops to do it for him. It had to be 
done very precisely, it took him some time to find someone who could actually make it 
properly. He finally gave the job to some guy called Fernández, who had two fine presses and 
was also based in the neighbourhood.  
 But I have to tell you something, he continued, the part bears little resemblance with 
the original drawing by The Car Company. I mean, the cap is still a cap, but the angles, the 
radii and all these things are quite different. The stuff they drew could not be manufactured. 
Vicente laughed. Sure, they may be good drawings, but they’re impossible to make, 
especially at the price they want to. The cap was supposed to be more rounded, but with those 
measures there was no way to attach it to the screw. It just couldn’t be hammered onto it. Or 
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maybe it could, but then the press would need sixteen operations instead of four, and this 
would mean making the part a lot more expensive. So we had to modify the angle, make it 
more open, because a sharp edge generates resistance. The engineers at The Car Company 
never wanted to admit it, that’s just how they are, but hey, it’s the only way the cap can be 
assembled.  
 There was this time when their manager was on sick leave and we were told by his 
substitute to make the caps properly. When the old manager later came back and saw the 
parts, he went What the hell have you done? They’ll be returned! And indeed they were. So 
we had to make them badly again. He even showed us all the paperwork and said that nobody 
had ever ok’d the changes, but everyone turned a blind eye because they knew that was the 
only way to get them done at that price. 
 Once machined, Vicente continued, we take the parts to thermal treatment to increase 
their resistance. They have to be tempered, they need to be springy so that you can hammer 
them onto the screw later on. Once tempered, the parts have to be stripped off the husk of the 
treatment, otherwise the paint won’t stick. The painting by the way is done in Alicante by 
cataphoresis. First, they give the parts a degreasing bath, to remove the oil from the previous 
processes and make sure they are perfectly clean. Then they are placed in racks that are 
immersed in the electrocoating bath, which works electrically and takes the exact amount of 
paint for each piece, microns. This is done by girls, said Vicente, because they have skinny 
fingers and are faster putting the parts in the rack. Once painted, the parts are brought here 
and we take them to a polyester treatment. This is expensive, because you have to put the 
parts one by one in another rack and spray-paint them. It also has to be the exact amount of 
paint. The cataphoresis and the polyester should add between 70 and 100 microns. It can’t be 
more than that or the piece won’t fit later on.  
 
 
 
 
14 
 There was once a purchasing manager at The Car Company who said from now on 
electrocoating only, to save costs. You can’t see the polyester treatment, and all the interior 
black metal parts look good with the cataphoresis paint only, so she thought it was worth 
trying. But these caps are external parts, and the sun eats them and they rust. So we went 
back to the polyester treatment. In fact, in the beginning, at the time of the first Model 
Alegria, they were chromium-plated. But that was too expensive, it cost more than 40 pesetas 
per piece. That’s when they decided for cataphoresis plus polyester. Now they cost about 25 
pesetas. But our share is minimal, he said, 1.20 pesetas, the same as the raw material; 
electrocoating plus transport to Alicante cost about 6 or 7 pesetas, polyester treatment 12... 
Vincent laughed. Yes, yes, I know, it’s a very laborious process, totally irrational. Other 
manufacturers, like Peugeot, have a much simpler system, a single piece of plastic with the 
cap already included in the hinge, and an inside screw. But you know what happens? That in 
these large companies is very difficult to change things. No one dares.  
 We used to supply the caps directly to The Car Company, because we had the Y9 
certification. But it all changed in the eighties. If a car had say 50,000 parts, they probably 
had 20,000 providers. And managing that was crazy, Purchasing Managers and Departments 
everywhere. So at some point they decided they weren’t going to buy parts anymore, but 
entire assembled components instead. They reduced the number of providers by a factor of 20 
and also asked them to demand their subcontractors the Y9 or ISO9000 certification. I think 
this was pioneered by Super López, the guy who left General Motors for Volkswagen, 
remember him? So, anyway, we stopped supplying the cap directly to The Car Company and 
started selling it instead to Peninsula Glassware, which were assembling the windows. The 
Car Company basically forced them to buy the part from us. Thing is, Peninsula Glassware 
was later bought by a French multinational, Saint-Germain, and I remember the new people 
at quality control were reluctant to accept the caps at first, because they didn’t correspond to 
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the original drawings. We had to explain to them that that was the way they had to be and that 
we were not going to change it. In fact, they never wanted the cap in the first place, because it 
is hammered onto a metal screw which has the exact diameter of the window hole, and 
sometimes the glass breaks when assembling it. They wanted the whole part to be made of 
plastic, like the Peugeot one, because if you force a plastic screw against the window hole, 
you scrape the plastic instead of breaking the glass. It’s even more airtight. But The Car 
Company has never wanted to change it, maybe because the Model Qiu is supposed to be 
discontinued soon. In fact, when we still sold the cap directly to them, my father-in-law had 
to make special nylon hammers for them, so they didn’t crush the caps when hammering 
them onto the screw. He even put a magnet inside the hammers, so the workers could grab 
the caps more easily. Vicente nodded his head.  
 It was lunchtime and the workers were leaving the workshop. Most of them would go 
home during the two-hour break. Belén joined us again. There are fewer and fewer businesses 
that want to work for the car industry these days, she said. It’s very competitive, too 
competitive. Prices go up, expenses go up, but they still force you to be 5% cheaper each year. 
Do what you need to do, they say, you already know the part you’re making. So each year we 
have to somehow sort it out… We used to make fifteen parts for them, and now we only do 
this one. It’s because of that; as time goes by you lose your profit margin.  
 You know what happens?, interrupted Vicente, you have to make a lot of parts to 
compensate for the yearly discount. You start with a good price, but after three or four years 
you are just breaking even on it. And after another three years you’re losing money on it. But 
if you make more parts, and invoice for say 500 million pesetas and manage to make a 10% 
or 5% profit, then that’s fine. You lose money on some, and make money on others, but 
overall you are still making a profit. Of course, this is a cheap and convenient system for 
them: they know they are paying a fair price on 25 to 30% of the parts; and they also know 
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you are barely breaking even on 30% of the parts and losing money on the rest. But they have 
managed to lower the total price by 20%. If you only make a few parts you just can’t make it. 
This is what happened to us, and that’s why my father-in-law eventually stopped 
manufacturing the other parts for them. They didn’t like that at the headquarters in Germany, 
and they wanted to stop all trade with us. But of course, the cap is basically our design. I 
mean, we’re the ones who have the original drawings, not of the part itself, which at the end 
of the day it’s their design, but the ones for the stamping press. They could draw them again, 
but it would cost them a lot. And since the Model Qiu is, so to speak, an endangered species, 
it’s not worth it.  
 I looked again at the black cap, only a couple of centimetres of size and a few grams 
of weight, before heading to the canteen.  
 
 
Towards a monadic ethnography I: object 
 
In this section the proposal for a ‘monadic ethnography’ will be outlined, drawing both from 
the theoretical discussion and the example presented above. My aim is to explore what it 
would mean for ethnographic research to take as its starting point Tarde’s monadology, that 
is, how his ‘pansocial’ (Lorenc, 2012) ontological hypothesis  – ‘everything is a society’ – 
may be translated into methodological strategies for doing ethnography. As it will become 
apparent, ‘monadic ethnography’ adopts and combines Deleuzian and Latournian 
appropriations of Tarde’s work.  
 Researching monads means, first of all, that our objects of study are better 
understood as relational assemblages or entanglements. That is, as ‘constellations of 
singularities’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), multiplicities made up of heterogeneous parts in 
relation. This in turn means that, if interrogated with sufficient sensitivity, elements are also 
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likely to reveal themselves as composite entities ad infinitum. In other words, every monad is, 
potentially, a monad of monads. This explains Tarde’s ‘infinitesimal’ approach to sociology, 
understood as a descent into the ‘small’, which is more complex – and indeed explains – the 
‘big’. As Latour et al. have put it commenting on this issue, Tarde’s hypothesis is that ‘there 
is more complexity in the elements than in the aggregates, or stated a bit more provocatively 
that “The whole is always smaller than its parts”’ (Latour et al., 2012: 2; see also Kwa, 2002; 
Law, 2004). This is an image I find useful to the extent that it conveys a sense of the monads’ 
counterintuitive internal architecture. But as explained above, Tarde’s monadology is a 
system of open relations where monads relate to other monads and where, at least in principle, 
everything could be connected to everything. This means that in addition to consisting of a 
multiplicity of parts, monads are also likely to be part of larger multiplicities6. Therefore, 
what we identify as a monad at each stage of our analyses is to a large extent an effect of our 
position and perspective with regards to the relational web we are tapping into.  
 The story of the black cap provides a good example of this. First, the cap can only be 
understood through the association of workers, machines, production protocols, clients, raw 
materials, transport networks, etc. If inspected closely, it would not be hard to see in each of 
those entities monads-within-the-monad: the technical drawings, the production instructions, 
the contracts and the suppliers could all become entanglements in themselves, subject to the 
same dynamic of heterogeneity, coordination and instability as the car part itself. Moreover, 
in exploring the connections that shaped the black cap, such disparate processes as 
Barcelona’s renewal plans, new industrial groupings in France and changes in the supply 
chain for a certain car company based in Germany became entangled.  
 Importantly, the relations and connections between and within monads are 
modulated by their basic drive, their ‘avidity’. This ‘eagerness’ means that monads engage in 
a constant dynamic of mutual possession: they will try to conquer or assimilate other monads, 
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and will in turn be approached and taken by others. Their desire for hegemony will sooner or 
later be met by another monad’s competing avidity, resulting in a never-ending process of 
coupling and decoupling and a permanent battle for hegemony. Using more contemporary 
terms, there is no escape from relations of power in the study of monads, understood as a 
circulation rather than a location7. Monads are unstable arrangements, not so much in the 
sense of being permanently at risk of falling apart, but in the sense that their crystallisation at 
any given time is the result of a provisional equilibrium between forces. Vicente and Belén’s 
narrative provided clear evidence of how power modulated the relations between the parts: 
the German headquarters, for instance, exerted an increasing hegemony by reshuffling the 
supply chain at one point, demanding the ISO9000 standard, and in the form of a 5% annual 
discount rate. Rather than a metaphysics of cosmic harmony in the vein of classic 
monadologies, Tarde’s neo-monadology is an ontology of universal struggle.   
 The above remarks suggest that doing monadic ethnography consists, to a large 
extent, in delving into this potentially infinite unfolding of relations and new monads, and 
charting a path through their avidity, mutual possession, and struggle for hegemony. Monads 
are bottomless, chasmic; monadic ethnography an abyssal endeavour.8  
 The monads’ characteristics also suggest the need to deploy a diachronic form of 
analysis to fully grasp them. In relation to this, Georgina Born has convincingly argued about 
the need to incorporate Tarde’s theory of imitation-opposition-innovation in the discussion of 
his monadology, noting that his method is concerned with ‘analysing not only the elementary 
structures of process…, but their cumulative outcome in historical trajectories of variation or 
transformation, stability or stasis’ (2010: 235).  
 The black cap, for example, revealed itself to be a continuous variation whose 
stability can only be described as a synchronic fiction. The part was a constant succession of 
transformations in the association between materials, providers, procedures, etc. 
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Collaboration as well as competition between monads (or ‘adaptation’ and ‘opposition’ in 
Tarde’s terms) animated these transformations: the client demanded a lower price, the glass 
factory lobbied for a change in materials, the manufacturer adapted the design to the 
budget… And yet, the part did not become something else altogether (see Law 2002). 
Accounting for its endurance is just as important as accounting for its continuous change. In 
fact, the story of the black cap is a remarkable tale of resilience (in the form among other 
things of several ‘re-alignments’ of the parties involved) on the face of the radical 
transformations brought about by the vertical integration of European car manufacturing. The 
Tardian monad is a highly appropriate concept to describe this combination of variation and 
obduracy.9  
 Born further argues that the study of monads indeed requires ‘an expanded analytics 
of temporalities’ that goes beyond the ‘monotemporality of becoming, which can flatten out 
and pre-empt investigation of the multiplicity of time’ (Born, 2010: 243). The idea here is 
that monads are made of heterogenous temporal relations, trajectories, and rates of change. In 
other words, monads are palimpsestic, an amalgam of temporal sediments; doing monadic 
ethnography calls for an investigation of their traces, the equivalent of a geological cross-
section.10 The black cap, for example, was traversed by the multiplicity of temporalities 
enacted by its different parts: the long duration of the materials, the shorter duration of 
quality standards and machine tools; the high rate of change within transport networks and 
the (relative) stability of the workforce… These different temporal trajectories and histories 
of change left some traces, which ethnographic fieldwork revealed. 
 This immanent conceptualisation of time has a parallel in the way that monadology 
approaches space. Rather than situating monads in a pre-existing and fixed Euclidian matrix, 
it is perhaps more appropriate to study how monads enact their own conditions of spatial 
im/possibility (this is an argument well-articulated in ANT: see Law, 2002: 92; Latour, 2005). 
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Instead of a stable geography of scales and its concomitant vocabulary of micro and macro, 
local and global, monadology relies on a topology of connections and intensity, in which 
spatial arrangements are performed and achieved. The black cap tale was not about local 
processes affected by global dynamics, but about the enactment of a set of relations that 
produced a given spatial arrangement. In other words, the ‘post-Fordist’ restructuring of the 
car industry was not above and afar, but rather a concrete and localised wave of changes 
within the relational organisation of the production.  
  
 
Towards a monadic ethnography II: form  
This brief account of how neo-monadology transforms our objects of study already suggests 
the basic shape of an ethnographic approach towards them. In effect, the research of Tardian 
monads implies a certain monadisation of their research. Questions of form are, then, central 
to the debate. Monadic ethnography relies on formal strategies that can adequately convey the 
transformation of its object of study outlined above.11  
 One of the defining characteristics of ethnography, at least in its classic sense, is that 
it operates from within the society, group or setting it studies and through interaction with its 
actors. Monadic ethnography also relies on being conducted from the inside – it is only 
through relations that we can study relations, as Strathern and others have argued. Moreover, 
it is only from within that we can overcome the illusion of perfectly stable and finished 
entities and start to discern their immense internal complexity and agitation. Studying 
monads from within is therefore an active rejection of the ‘view from above’ (or ‘nowhere’), 
that is, an external, superior, detached perspective (see Haraway, 1988). Monadic 
ethnography is about looking at the world from the monad’s point of view – or, as Viveiros 
de Castro (2003) would put it, seeing the world the monad sees. Latour et al. have argued 
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along the same lines that monads are ‘a point of view on all the other entities taken severally 
and not as a totality… The “whole world”, as Leibniz said, would be “grasped” or “reflected” 
through this idiosyncratic point of view’ (Latour et al., 2012: 7). This is an important issue I 
will come back to in the conclusion. Tarde’s monadology implies a multiplicity of possible 
points of view; consequently, discovering and adopting such perspectives is part of the 
monadic ethnographer’s job. 
 Again, the story of the black cap can help us advance in the discussion. I constructed 
the text as a non-verbatim conversation for three reasons. First, it was a way of letting 
Vicente and Belén’s understanding and description of the production of the car part drive the 
narrative – instead of mine, or any external point of view. The ‘dialogic’ (Bakhtin, 1981) 
form adopted, inspired by Peter Weiss’ The Aesthetics of Resistance12 (2005), was an 
experiment in removing all (academic) commentary and taking seriously the way the 
informants told the story and performed the theoretical work themselves and in their own 
vernacular. The absence of a second-level, ‘authorised’ voice that clarifies, ratifies, explains, 
etc. was my way of recognising that the extraordinary story of the black cap, with all its 
monadic quality, belonged to them; it was their ‘theory’. It took me a while to recognise that 
there was a remarkable isomorphism at play: Tarde’s monadology had triggered an interest in 
exploring objects as relational assemblages that eventually led me to the black cap; Vicente 
and Belén, in turn, deployed a rather monadological strategy in their account of its fabrication, 
which I set out to reproduce in my writing. I will return to the important question of whose 
ontology we talk about when we talk about monadology in the conclusion.  
 Secondly, removing quotation marks and dialogue lines highlighted the constructed 
nature of the text. The fragment above is not the transcription of a taped fieldwork interview; 
it is a re-construction of notes and recollections of several conversations, which I assembled 
and gave to Vicente and Belén to read and comment. Although the ‘style’ was solely my 
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choice, the production of the text involved discussions in which the anonymity of the sensible 
elements was decided, my inaccuracies corrected, further detail provided, and the overall tone 
and direction of the narrative agreed. However limited our collaboration was, I think it points 
at an important methodological strategy and a logical consequence of the commitment to 
adopt the monad’s point of view as opposed to an external one. Vicente and Belén acted as 
the spokesmen for the black cap, as it were; it was only coherent with the principles of 
monadic ethnography outline above to enter a dialogue with them.  
 Thirdly and very briefly, deploying a dialogic format was also a matter of 
interpellation: I wanted to put the reader in the position of the attentive listener that I had 
occupied during fieldwork.  
 The significance of these three gestures can probably only be gasped by briefly 
considering what not trying to engage with the monad from within would look like. The black 
cap story could have easily been framed as an example of the global post-Fordist 
transformation of the car industry which started in the late seventies. I could have provided a 
general description of such transformation as discussed in the specialist literature and then 
use fragments of my fieldwork to illustrate how it was experienced locally in the context of 
my study. This would not only reduce the actors’ own theory of the reality they inhabit to 
mere side evidence, but also betray the fundamental monadological insight that the key to 
understanding the post-Fordist transformation lies in the small, in the myriad actions of its 
tiny components.  
 I would like to conclude this section by making clear that I am not arguing that 
dialogic writing is monadic ethnography’s only or even preferred formal strategy. Far from it. 
My intention was simply to make explicit the choices I made in this particular instance of 
monadic description, as a result of trying to accommodate the object and the situation I was 
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studying. I would not want to prevent the development of other forms of monadic 
ethnography by setting out formal guidelines.  
 
Conclusion: ontology, monadology, ethnography 
This article has explored the shape ethnography may take if one was to accept Gabriel 
Tarde’s bold monadological hypothesis, namely that ‘everything is a society’. For Tarde (and 
later on for Latour), ‘society’ and ‘social’ describe a universal form of association between 
heterogeneous elements, rather than a specific human aggregate. The resulting relational 
assemblages, or ‘monads’, are characterised by their infinitesimal complexity, irreducible 
heterogeneity, their openness and avidity toward other monads, and their chronically unstable 
condition. Tarde’s monadology is based on the primacy of difference over identity, the 
interest in relations of possession or “having” rather than a concern over “being”, and the 
centrality of hegemony (both within and between monads) in the conceptualisation of 
relationality. This particular combination of claims we have come to associate with 
Deleuzian- and ANT-inspired perspectives is, in my opinion, one of the reasons why the 
experiment of (re)thinking ethnography through Tarde’s monadology is worth considering: as 
I have attempted to show in the previous sections, compared to some versions of ANT, 
monadic ethnography places a greater emphasis on relations of power and temporal dynamics; 
compared to some appropriations of Deleuzian theory, it is less speculative and more 
committed to fieldwork, to making sense of these assemblages from within, to ‘following the 
actors’. Monadic ethnography may be in a position to balance out Deleuzian and Latourian 
readings of Tarde and negotiate a tricky yet productive in-betweenness.  
 Inasmuch as Tarde’s monadology constitutes a strong ontological affirmation with 
regards to the make-up of the world, it may be productive to relate the project of a monadic 
ethnography to recent debates around the so-called ‘ontological turn’ in the social sciences – 
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particularly within anthropology and Science and Technology Studies (STS). After all, the 
usefulness, appropriateness and politics of this growing interest in metaphysical questions in 
the context of social research cannot be taken for granted. Although a full account of this 
ongoing debate is outside the scope of this conclusion, it may be useful to briefly revisit some 
key positions within it.13  
 In anthropology, the question of ontology arises out of the perennial challenge of 
appropriately attending to systems of thought and theories which are other to ours, perhaps 
even incompatible. For Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, one of the early proponents of a 
becoming-ontology for the discipline,   
 
the language of ontology is important for one specific and, let’s say, tactical reason. It acts as a counter-
measure to a derealizing trick frequently played against the native’s thinking, which turns this thought 
into a kind of sustained phantasy, by reducing it to the dimensions of a form of knowledge or 
representation, that is, to an “epistemology” or a “worldview” (2003: 18).  
 
The need to ‘take seriously’ the ontologies of the peoples one studies, that is, not as 
‘worldviews’ but as ‘worlds that are viewed’, not as ‘opinions’ but as ‘objectively 
experienced worlds’, is at the basis of Viveiros de Castro’s (2010; 2011) groundbreaking 
work on Amerindian perspectivism – an ontology he defines as ‘perpendicular’ and 
incommensurable to ours. Whereas Western ontology is based on the assumption that only 
one world/nature exists, which can however be interpreted or represented in many different 
ways (mono-naturalism, multiculturalism), perspectivism inverts this and establishes that 
there is one culture (shared among humans, spirits, animals and some plants) and many 
natures (mono-culturalism, multinaturalism). All entities see (‘represent’) the world in the 
same way, through the same categories (‘food’, ‘home’, etc.) but the world they see is 
different (blood for us, beer for jaguars; mud for us, ceremonial palace for tapirs). The 
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importance of encountering this radically other ontology for Viveiros de Castro lies in its 
capacity to unsettle Western ontology, in particular its self-perceived superiority. By 
acknowledging the existence of alternative ontologies and engaging with them as proper 
metaphysical systems, anthropology – argues Viveiros de Castro – may finally be in a 
position to close its ‘karmic cycle’ and take on its new mission as the ‘theory-practice of the 
permanent decolonisation of thought’ (2010: 14) or, in other words, to become ‘the science of 
the ontological self-determination of the world’s peoples’ (2003:18).  
 In sharp contrast, Phillipe Descola’s work (2013) has engaged with the multiplicity 
of ontologies found in ethnographic studies as a problem of classification, and consequently 
developed a taxonomy based on how similarities and differences between humans and non-
humans are established across two distinct dimensions, ‘interiority’ and ‘physicality’. 
Western ontology, which he calls ‘naturalism’, distinguishes humans from non-humans based 
on their internal difference, namely that only humans have a soul, consciousness, subjectivity 
and language. This ontology, dominant in the West since the 17th Century, co-exists with 
three others: ‘animism’, ‘totemism’ and ‘analogism’. For Descola, perspectivism is a 
particular ‘type’ of animism, where the distinction between humans and non-humans is based 
on their physicality, i.e. their physiological, perceptual and sensory-motor features. In short, 
in the work of Descola, the language ontology is an instrument for developing a ‘relativist 
universalism’ in anthropology – rather than, as Viveiros de Castro argued, a ‘bomb’ in the 
discipline’s headquarters (see Latour, 2009 for a review of a debate between the two). 
 Yet another distinguishable form of engagement with ontology has been articulated 
by STS scholars. In a recent review of the ‘ontological turn’ in their field, Woolgar and 
Lezaún (2013) argue that while the ‘turn’ may indeed be seen as a move away from 
epistemology (‘the object of inquiry is the very existence or being of entities, not merely the 
modes of knowing pre-existing entities’), this distinction has rarely been stable within STS, a 
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perspective whose main concern is the analysis of how things come to be what they are, how 
objects and subjects are enacted and performed – in other words, ‘how in practice, and in 
detail, particular ontologies are achieved’. Rather than committing to a particular ontology or 
‘theory of what there is’,  
 
our field’s current curiosity about ontologies and their enactment is best understood as a way of 
extending its idiosyncratic critical sensibility – an appreciation of fluidity in seemingly stable entities, a 
recognition of difference beyond claims to singularity (and vice versa), a reluctance to take the world at 
face value – to the realm of the ready-made, to the world of those entities whose being might seem 
most unproblematic and ordinary. (2013: 336) 
 
Where, then, stands monadic ethnography in all this? In my opinion, it represents a fourth 
mode of engagement with ontology, different from the three above and yet with selective 
affinities to all of them. This is because the monadology it is founded upon is both an 
ontology in itself (a theory of the make-up of reality based on monads and their relations) and 
a method for studying the monads’ own ontologies. Tarde’s monadology is therefore both an 
alternative to hegemonic naturalism (another ontology), and ‘a way of making sense of a 
world woven from multiple ontologies’ (Lorenc, p.c.) (a privileged route onto other 
ontologies). At the same time, Tarde’s definition of monads as more or less fragile 
achievements implies a sustained interested in how they come to be, how they attain and 
maintain their ontological status. In his afterword to MS, Theo Lorenc develops the idea that 
Tarde’s monadology implies a continuity between the ontological activity of the researcher 
and that of her objects: 
 
the scientific or metaphysical theories we develop to explain reality would not be foreign to the 
elements, but on the contrary, would be profoundly continuous with the cosmic plans which form their 
own most intimate reality. Each element has, and in some sense is, an ontological theory of its own. 
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Thus, Tardean metaphysics could be described as an ontology of ontologies: the universe is woven 
from the theorizing activity of its innumerable elements. (Lorenc, 2012: 92) 
 
With this fractal scheme of self-similarity, Tarde elegantly addresses the ontological duplicity 
inherent to his argument. When it comes to doing ethnography, I would argue this duplicity is 
not so much a problem as a basic fieldwork condition: the people we work with also have 
their theories about the make-up of the world, and the relationship between theirs and ours is 
an empirical matter. In this article, an instance of remarkable isomorphism was presented – 
but it is not hard to imagine scenarios of conflict, incommensurability or plain 
misunderstanding14.  
 Faced with a similar predicament, Henare et al. (2007) argued that ‘hosting’ 
alternative cosmologies does not necessarily mean replacing the old ‘episteme of all 
epistemes’ with a totalising ‘ontology of all ontologies’, but rather ‘recuperat[ing] a facility 
[for concept production] informants may already have’ and developing a methodology that 
might generate a ‘multiplicity of theories’ (2007: 16). This approach in turn echoes Latour’s 
argument that ANT analysts should only possess an infra-language ‘whose role is simply to 
help them become attentive to the actors’ own fully developed meta-language, a reflexive 
account of what they are saying’ (2005: 49) – a move that as he acknowledges can be 
considered a revitalisation of ethnomethodology’s programme: the study of the procedures by 
which society is produced by its members, and the theories they use to make sense of it 
(Garfinkel, 1967). 
  With regards to monadic ethnography, I would not be disappointed if the engagement 
with ontology translates into a minimal and rather humble aspiration: to become a form of 
research that, starting from a monadological understanding of reality, is open to engaging 
with the monads’ performative power at all levels, including their theoretical and ontological 
work. Monadic ethnography may then become a battleground for the competition between 
 
 
 
 
28 
theories, or a version (or a variation) of the monads’ own theorising work. On occasion, it 
may become a vehicle for the transformation – perhaps even the possession – of our 
conceptualisations by those of the monads. In any case, an ethnographic approach based on 
the respect towards and attentiveness to the actors’ own theories seems to me a valuable first 
step for this newly born creature; it carries with it an invitation to devise forms of theoretical 
collaboration and co-production with the people we work with and a call for an ethnographic 
practice which is seen, at its core, as an inventive activity, a machine for distributing new 
ideas, concepts, theories, beings.   
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